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Abstract
The need to integrate social and economic factors into conservation planning has become a focus of academic discussions
and has important practical implications for the implementation of conservation areas, both private and public. We
conducted a survey in the Daly Catchment, Northern Territory, to inform the design and implementation of a stewardship
payment program. We used a choice model to estimate the likely level of participation in two legal arrangements -
conservation covenants and management agreements - based on payment level and proportion of properties required to
be managed. We then spatially predicted landholders’ probability of participating at the resolution of individual properties
and incorporated these predictions into conservation planning software to examine the potential for the stewardship
program to meet conservation objectives. We found that the properties that were least costly, per unit area, to manage
were also the least likely to participate. This highlights a tension between planning for a cost-effective program and
planning for a program that targets properties with the highest probability of participation.
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Introduction
Private land conservation is becoming more prominent and
important as expansion of strict protected areas is increasingly
constrained by reduced availability of land, insufficient budgets for
acquisition, and escalating management costs of small, isolated
reserves [1–3]. Longstanding conservation programs on private
land include the US Conservation Reserve Program [4] and, in
Australia, the Victorian Bush Tender Program [5].
Farmers, Indigenous owners and other private landholders
manage approximately 77% of Australia’s land area. This statistic
alone indicates that conservation on private land is integral to
Australia’s biodiversity conservation strategy [6]. All Australian
states and territories have legislation for conservation covenanting
on private properties, although some state programs are longer
established and cover larger areas than others [7]. Several states
have competitive tendering for conservation contracts including
the Victorian Bush Tender Program [5], the New South Wales
Environmental Services Scheme, and the Queensland Nature
Assist program.
Understanding landholders’ willingness to participate has two
important implications for private land conservation. First, this
understanding will shape policy for the design of incentives. For
example, factors specific to program design, such as proposed land
management, constraints on land title, and delivery of incentives,
will influence willingness to participate [8]. Typical approaches to
assess the design and viability of stewardship programs include
methods such as choice modelling and auctions [9,10]. While these
approaches will reveal expected participation levels and provide
insights into the effective design of programs, they are not typically
structured to assess whether a program is likely to achieve spatial
conservation objectives.
The second implication of information on willingness to
participate is that identifying willing landholders is vital to
identifying areas that are both valuable for achieving objectives
and feasible for conservation action. For example, a map of
landholders’ willingness can be used to design a configuration of
protected areas that will, at least in theory, be more easily
implemented because it selects those properties owned or managed
by people more likely to engage in formal protection [11].
Alternatively, a map of landholders’ willingness can be used to
assess the likely spatial configuration of voluntary, private
protected-area management resulting from a conservation auction,
demonstrating the scope for an auction program to achieve
conservation outcomes.
Combining willingness and spatial conservation priorities will
allow for conservation programs to enhance the likelihood that
spatial conservation objectives are met. One example of the
potential to incorporate spatial conservation priorities into the
auction process is the Western Australian Conservation Auction,
in which assessment of the benefits offered by properties accounted
for complementarity of conservation values between bids [12].
This process demonstrated the potential to integrate well-
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developed auction processes with spatial planning to establish sets
of private conservation areas that maximized the achievement of
conservation objectives within budgets. The conservation out-
comes of a program might also depend on aspects of spatial
configuration of the properties selected [13–15], for example to
achieve objectives related to connectivity and buffering from
surrounding land uses. The potential to consider configuration as
well as representation of ecosystems and species has been
demonstrated in applications to protect and restore private lands
[16,17]. Furthermore, configuration of properties might have
important social implications in addition to ecological benefits. For
example, landholders might be more inclined to participate in a
program if their neighbours are participating, one reason being the
added certainty that benefits associated with improved manage-
ment would not be at risk from unmanaged threats nearby (e.g.
spread of unmanaged weeds or fire) [18,19].
Of the Australian states and territories, the Northern Territory’s
policies and funding for conservation on private lands are the least
developed, with financial support for conservation covenants and
management agreements under consideration. Therefore, we
undertook a pilot study in the Daly Catchment to assess the
potential for such programs to meet conservation objectives. The
program under consideration is for stewardship payments to
leverage already extensive routine land management by altering or
extending land management practices to meet conservation
objectives on private lands. The program would include
covenants, which are perpetual titles on private land, as well as
management agreements, which are legal agreements between the
Government and landholders. We have examined aspects of
designing the program such as costs and payment structures [18].
Here, we report on landholders’ willingness to participate in such a
program.
Our study had three aims. The first was to assess landholders’
willingness to participate and inform the design of a stewardship-
payment program in the Daly Catchment, Northern Territory.
We used a choice experiment to estimate the probability of
participation in the program relative to: 1. contract type (covenant
versus management agreement); 2. payment amount; and 3.
required change in proportion of property managed for conser-
vation. These factors have been identified as important in
influencing participation in programs in other regions (e.g.,
participants relying on production for income may require higher
levels of compensation) [20,21]. Choice modelling can estimate the
effects of combinations of factors on participants’ choices and is
therefore useful for designing policies [22,23] and has been used in
other regions to explore the influence of attributes such as
compensation and duration of contract on willingness to
participate [21,24]. The choice model allowed us to estimate the
expected level of participation in a program in the Daly, which can
indicate the viability of the program more broadly and provide
guidelines to the Government about adequate budgets to meet
desired participation levels. The choice model also allowed us to
examine landholders’ preferences for the two mechanisms
presented (covenants and management agreements) and how
these preferences varied with respect to payment amount and
required change in proportion of property to be managed for
conservation.
Our second aim was to assess the potential of the stewardship
program to meet spatial conservation objectives. We therefore
predicted spatially landholders’ willingness to participate at the
resolution of individual properties and incorporated these predic-
tions into conservation planning software. Predicting willingness to
participate for individual properties allowed us to consider the
potential spatial distribution of participating properties and
therefore the likely conservation outcomes relative to vegetation
types mapped across the catchment. Understanding whether a
stewardship program would have the desired impacts of achieving
adequate protection for spatially variable conservation features is
an important step in scoping a program that has been
underutilized.
The third aim of our study was to analyze how the interactions
between willingness to participate and conservation costs can
influence solutions identified in spatial conservation planning. The
potential correlations between conservation costs and willingness
to participate have not yet been examined, although they could
determine the success of a conservation program. For example, if
costs and willingness are negatively correlated then an incentive
program would probably be feasible: the properties most likely to
be included would also be the most cost-efficient to engage.
However, a positive correlation would mean that the most willing
landholders also have the least cost-efficient properties, posing
difficulties for the design of an incentive scheme. We examined the
implications of interactions between costs and willingness to
participate in our study region. Our study is the first to incorporate
both spatially variable willingness to participate and spatially
variable costs. Therefore, this is the first study to elucidate how
these two components of the planning problem interact and
potentially enhance or constrain capacity to meet conservation
objectives.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by James Cook University’s Human
Ethics Committee (H3283).
Study Area
The study area was the whole of the Daly River catchment in
the Northern Territory, covering approximately 5.2 million ha
and extending from the coastline south-west of Darwin to 250 km
inland (Figure 1A). The Daly River is one of the major river
systems in the Top End. Riparian strips in the Daly catchment
contain some of the most extensive gallery (rainforest) vegetation
in the Northern Territory. Five of the sixty-seven sites of
conservation significance identified in the Northern Territory
occur in the Daly Catchment [25]. Approximately 10% of the
catchment is protected by national parks, such as Nitmiluk Gorge,
and Indigenous Protected Areas, such as Fish River. However,
protection is not representative across the 105 mapped vegetation
types, with 48 having at least 10% area protected and the
remaining 57 having less than 10% area protected. Therefore,
considerable effort is still needed to ensure adequate and
representative protection of the vegetation types in the Daly
catchment. In addition, the Daly catchment area is regarded as a
highly prospective region for further development. The potential
for future pressure to clear native vegetation makes the area a high
priority for conservation to ensure valued areas are adequately
protected.
The many conservation priorities in the catchment are unlikely
to be addressed with further acquisition for national parks because
of the large property sizes and correspondingly large acquisition
and management costs. Instead, the region is suitable for off-
reserve programs involving stewardship payments in conjunction
with conservation agreements between the Government and
landholders. The mean size of private properties in the Daly is
,10,500 ha (median size 90 ha). Properties larger than 5,000 ha
represent approximately 13% of landholders but about 90% of the
catchment’s private land (Figure 1B). Therefore, engaging with
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relatively few landholders has the potential for extensive conser-
vation benefits. In addition to engaging with private landholders,
the Government is interested in funding new Indigenous Protected
Areas. These are agreements between traditional owners and the
Australian Government, considered to be similar to national parks.
Funding both Indigenous Protected Areas and a stewardship
program on non-Indigenous properties would equitably provide
opportunities for all Daly residents to access financial support for
conservation management.
Discussions with the Northern Territory Government
The Northern Territory is the only Australian jurisdiction
without well-established arrangements for covenants and conser-
vation management agreements. Therefore, we used the structure
of the Queensland Nature Refuge program, which supports
establishment of covenants on freehold and leasehold land, as the
basis for designing our survey questions. The state of Queensland
has more private land under covenant (referred to as Nature
Refuges) than any other Australian jurisdiction [26] and has
recently implemented legislation, called the Delbessie Agreement,
to encourage participation in the program by landholders on
extensive leasehold properties [27]. Under the Delbessie Agree-
ment, lessees with properties identified as having conservation
value must either enter into a Nature Refuge agreement and be
rewarded with a 10-year lease extension or elect to have their
properties acquired if they do not wish to participate.
We undertook a series of conversations with the Northern
Territory Government that indicated that the relevant agency
would consider a scheme similar to Queensland’s Nature Refuge
program and that the Daly catchment was a high priority area for
trialling such a program. We therefore designed our survey with
the assumptions that the Northern Territory would model its
covenant program for private land on Queensland’s and that
legislation similar to Queensland’s Delbessie Agreement would be
considered to support the environmentally sustainable, productive
use of rural leasehold land.
Based on a pilot survey, below, and discussions with the
Northern Territory Government, including staff working on
private protected-area initiatives and spatial conservation plan-
ning, we identified three realistic parameters of a stewardship
program. First, the Government would pay a premium to engage
landholders in conservation covenants in preference to manage-
ment agreements because of the perceived benefits of permanent
title for conservation (payments of 150% of actual stewardship
costs for covenants as opposed to 100% of actual stewardship costs
for management agreements). Second, most landholders are
currently not managing any areas for conservation, over and
above routine property management. Third, landholders partic-
ipating in the stewardship program would be required to manage
several small patches on their property for conservation.
Officers of the Northern Territory Government also indicated
that they would consider equal funding for Indigenous Protected
Areas alongside funding for a stewardship program on private land
to ensure that funds were available for conservation across tenures.
Choice Modelling Experiment and Survey Methods
The survey included questions about the characteristics of
landholders and properties, current expenditures on land man-
agement and conservation management, and other information
specific to the choice experiments. For the choice experiment,
respondents were asked to consider the hypothetical scenario of a
stewardship program with three alternatives for landholders:
conservation covenant, conservation management agreement, or
sell property. Choice experiments typically include a status-quo or
default option. In our design, we did not include an ‘opt-out’
option because we wanted to mirror legislation similar to the
Delbessie Agreement. Under that arrangement, ‘sell property’
could be considered the opt-out or status quo because it is the only
option for landholders unwilling to place portions of their
properties under covenant. Not all on-farm conservation programs
have similar ‘conserve or sell’ clauses, so the results of this
experiment are not transferrable to those situations. Indeed, the
probabilities of participation estimated here will likely exceed those
obtained in situations where neither sale nor participation is
necessary. Our results are therefore optimistic estimates of
environmental outcomes from a stewardship program and we
would expect larger shortfalls in meeting conservation objectives
in situations with the default option of not participating.
Figure 1. The Daly catchment and pastoral and horticultural properties. The map inset shows the Northern Territory with pale shading and
the Daly catchment in black. A) Rivers, protected areas and boundaries of properties (cadastre). Two large national parks extend into the north-east
corner of the catchment: Nitmiluk National Park and the southern portion of Kakadu National Park. Fish River Indigenous Protected Area is in the
north-west portion of the catchment. B) Size distribution of the 440 properties included in our survey.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097941.g001
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Based on landholders’ attitudes and responses to the Nature
Refuge program, we hypothesized that willingness to participate in
a program would depend on the type of agreement (covenant or
management agreement), the proportion of property already set
aside for conservation, the additional proportion of property to be
set aside for the program, and the financial payment relative to
costs of conservation management above day-to-day land man-
agement costs [8,20]. Adams et al. [18] estimated the additional
costs of conservation management above day-to-day land man-
agement costs for landholders in the Daly and we term these costs
‘stewardship costs’. We assumed for our study that landholders
would receive stewardship payments as a function of their
additional costs to achieve conservation objectives.
In a pilot study, we tested different attributes of a stewardship
program to ensure they were cognitively accessible to respondents.
Based on the pilot study, we represented financial payment as a
percentage of stewardship costs because these costs will vary with
current management activities and characteristics of properties,
including size. We assumed that financial payments would range
from 0% to 150% of stewardship costs (presented to survey
respondents as a payment relative to actual costs incurred,
Figure 2), and used incremental amounts across that range to
allow interpolation between points in our model (Figure 3). We
represented the required change in proportion of property set
aside for conservation with five representative combinations
identified from the pilot study (Figure 3). We constructed the
choice sets using a full factorial design, resulting in 80 different
combinations (4 covenant payments64 management agreement
payments65 changes in proportion of property set aside). Because
80 choice sets would be too demanding for a respondent, we chose
a blocked full factorial design; blocking is a common way to handle
the trade-off between maximising the data collected from each
respondent and fatigue of the respondent [28]. The choice sets
were blocked into 8 versions of the choice experiment. Each
participant was randomly assigned a block of ten choice sets and
we ensured that the received responses were evenly distributed
across the 80 choice sets. Respondents were given a set of
definitions for alternative stewardship arrangements or sale of
property using an information box and then asked to choose the
preferred option in each choice set (example in Figure 2).
For our survey, we considered only land parcels in the
catchment of 10 ha or larger and excluded properties within the
town of Katherine (Figure 1). Properties in the town or smaller
than 10 ha are probably not good candidates for conservation
agreements because they are predominantly residential and
unmanaged. We sent surveys to all landholders eligible for private
land stewardship agreements, defined here as all 440 pastoralist
landholders [see 18 for more details]. We used the Dillman
tailored design method [29]. Of the 440 landholders contacted, 25
requested to be removed from the survey and 50 addresses were
no longer active, leaving a total of 365 possible respondents. The
response rate to the survey (about 25%, or 92 of 365 landholders,
with 710 choice sets completed) was in line with similar surveys in
the region [30,31]. Responses were also representative of property
size and types across the catchment [18] (Survey S1). Based on
Orme’s rule of thumb [32,33] the target number of respondents
was 125. While our achieved response (92) was approximately
25% less than the target and we acknowledge that a small sample
is likely to be high risk, our estimated coefficients were all
statistically significant suggesting that our sample size was
adequate.
Choice Experiment Analysis
We analyzed the choice sets using a conditional mixed-effects
logit model in STATA version 9. Based on the choice experiment,
the probability of an individual i choosing an alternative m is given
by
P yi ~ mDxi,zið Þ~ exp zimczxibmð ÞP
j exp zijczxibj
 
where alternative specific variables for individual i for alternative m
are given by zim and coefficients are denoted by c, case-specific
variables for individual i are given by xi, and coefficients are
denoted by b. In our choice experiment, conservation payments
were alternative-specific while conservation configuration was
case-specific and landholder-specific variables were included as
case-specific variables. We explored a range of landholder-specific
variables including size of property, engagement in conservation
efforts, land use, number of years on property, and natural
characteristics of properties [18]. In our final model we included
the only two statistically significant landholder-specific variables:
size of property (ln(property size, ha)); and a binary flag indicating
whether the landholder was currently engaged in conservation
management (conservation flag) (Table 1). Ideally, we would have
also tested whether sale values of properties influenced landhold-
ers’ choices to sell, but reliable sales data were not available for the
region.
Application of Choice Model
We used our final choice model (Table 1) for two purposes.
First, we explored how the probability of participation was affected
by different payment levels, to understand how to maximize
participation. Using the survey sample averages, we estimated the
catchment-wide average probability of participation in covenants
and management agreements based on three payment scenarios:
50% of stewardship costs for both conservation covenants and
conservation management agreements; 100% of stewardship costs
for both conservation covenants and conservation management
agreements; and 150% of stewardship costs for conservation
covenants and 100% of stewardship costs for conservation
management agreements. For these scenarios, we assumed
configuration 2 (no patches currently set aside for conservation
and landholders would be required to set aside several small
patches for conservation in the future). This was the most likely
configuration across the properties in the catchment. These
scenarios reflect discussions held with the NT Government about
the likely design of the payment program (see section on
discussions, above, for further detail).
The second use of the choice model was to create a map of
expected probability of participation of individual properties so
that our planning scenarios could preferentially select properties
with higher probabilities of participation. For each property, we
therefore estimated probability of participation assuming pay-
ments of 150% for covenants and 100% for management
agreements and configuration 2 (no patches currently set aside
for conservation and several patches to be set aside for
conservation in the future).
Spatial Planning Using Marxan with Zones
We conducted a spatial planning exercise to demonstrate how a
map of estimated probability of participation can be used to design
configurations of properties that contribute to conservation
objectives. In many settings, any one spatial configuration
identified during a planning process will change dynamically as
Determining Spatial Priorities for a Stewardship Program
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planners engage with stakeholders and the actual, as opposed to
estimated, willingness of landholders to participate is revealed [34].
If landholders identified in the initial configuration refuse to
participate, the configuration would be iteratively updated until
the full budget was exhausted. For our study, we assumed that the
identified configuration of properties would be used to direct first
engagement with landholders, so we compared initial configura-
tions between several scenarios (Table 2 and below).
We chose to explore how conservation objectives would be met
across the catchment, subject to constraints on funds and area
dedicated to conservation, by both Indigenous Protected Areas
and stewardship agreements collectively. Indigenous Protected
Areas, although very different mechanisms from covenants and
management agreements, were important to consider because of
the Government’s preparedness to consider them as part of an
overall approach to nature conservation. Using Marxan with
Zones [35] we planned for five zones: 1. national parks; 2.
Indigenous Protected Areas (IPAs); 3. stewardship agreements; 4.
riparian buffer areas and other sites that are protected under
clearing guidelines for the Daly catchment, termed here the ‘never
clear’ zone; and 5. un-engaged areas used for production but not
conservation management, termed here the ‘available’ zone. We
chose these zones to account for existing formal conservation areas
(zone 1) or parts of the catchment protected from clearing through
other measures (zone 4) and to explicitly plan for new conservation
areas through IPAs (zone 2) and stewardship agreements (zone 3).
Because of the size of the optimization problem (large number of
planning units, features, and zones), we chose to select properties
for a generalized ‘stewardship agreement’ zone without differen-
tiating between covenants and management agreements. For the
planning process, we assumed a single time step in which areas
were identified for engagement for stewardship or Indigenous
Protected Areas and that engagement and conservation manage-
ment would continue. It was beyond the scope of our study to
predict the vagaries of iterative adjustments to configurations [34]
as individual landholders are engaged and some decline partici-
pation.
Marxan, a widely used conservation planning tool, uses the
simulated annealing algorithm to minimize the objective function
score:
Pm
i~1
cixiz
Pm
i~1
Pm
h~1
xi  1{xhð Þcvih
subject to the constraint that objectives are met:
Pm
i~1
xirij§Tj , Vj
For m planning units, n features, rij is the occurrence level of
feature j in site i and xi is the control variable that indicates which
planning unit is in, or out of, the reserve system. Marxan with
Zones generalizes this approach by increasing the number of states
or zones to which a planning unit can be assigned.
We used Marxan with Zones to examine, for four scenarios,
possible spatial configurations of Indigenous Protected Areas and
stewardship agreements. The scenarios (Table 2) were designed to
examine the influence of variable costs and variable probability of
participation on: 1. the spatial configuration of properties selected
for a stewardship program; and 2. the capacity to meet
conservation objectives within budget constraints.
Scenario 1 (uniform costs). Cost of each planning unit is
equal to its area; not considering probability of participation.
Scenario 2 (variable costs). Cost of each planning unit is
equal to the expected cost of participation in a stewardship
program; not considering probability of participation.
Figure 2. Example choice set presented to respondents in survey.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097941.g002
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Scenario 3 (uniform costs + probability of
participation). Cost of each planning unit is equal to its area;
considering probability of participation.
Scenario 4 (variable costs + probability of
participation). Cost of each planning unit is equal to the
expected cost of participation in a stewardship program; consid-
ering probability of participation.
We divided all properties in the catchment into planning units
of square 25 ha grids (n = 212,173). Relatively small planning units
allowed us to capture already protected areas in ‘never clear’ zones
within properties and to identify spatial heterogeneity of conser-
vation priority within properties (as opposed to identifying only
whole properties as priorities). To control the aggregation of
selected areas [35], we identified the zone boundary cost for each
scenario with the method of Stewart & Possingham [36]. Because
properties were divided into multiple planning units we checked
that the percentage of each property selected for stewardship
agreements was in line with the configuration assumptions made
for calculating probability of participation. We included quanti-
tative objectives for 105 vegetation types and the 5 sites of
conservation significance in the Daly catchment, to give a total of
110 conservation features. The sites of conservation significance
within the Daly River catchment have been assessed as either
nationally or internationally significant and include features such
as the Daly River, Anson Bay and Floodplains and Western
Arnhem Plateau [25]. Based on discussions with the Northern
Territory Government Department for Natural Resources, Envi-
ronment, The Arts and Sport (NRETAS), our objectives were
30% of the current extent of each vegetation type (because pre-
clearing data were not available) and 100% of each site of
conservation significance. The Northern Territory has clearing
guidelines for the Daly that allocate buffers around sensitive
vegetation or other features that cannot be cleared (e.g. a required
250 meter buffer around all streams) [37]. Therefore, we locked all
required buffers (the ‘never clear’ zone in Marxan with Zones) into
the selected conservation configuration for all scenarios. In
addition, we locked in all existing national parks and Indigenous
Protected Areas. We assumed that the different zones contributed
differentially to conservation objectives (Table 2), reflecting
different levels of commitment of management to conservation.
Marxan with Zones minimizes the total cost of the zoning plan
C:
Figure 3. Attribute levels and changes for the choice experiment. The survey provided respondents with three alternatives: conservation
covenant, conservation management agreement, or sell property. The choice experiment explored two attributes that might influence respondents’
choices: payment level as a percentage of stewardship costs (defined here as the additional costs of managing land for conservation, over and above
routine property management) and change in extent and configuration of conservation management, defined relative to current configuration
(From) and future configuration (To). We considered four payment levels and five changes in configuration.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097941.g003
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C~
XM
i~1
XN
j~1
cijxij
where xij=1 if the i
th planning unit is included in the jth zone,
subject to the constraint that a planning unit can only be placed in
one zone. For scenarios 1 and 3, a uniform cost was used for
planning units (i.e. cost was equal to the area of the planning unit).
For scenarios 2 and 4 a spatially variable cost was used for
Table 1. Conditional mixed-effects logit model.
Variable Coefficient SE
CC intercept 0.3704 0.3861
CMA intercept 0.3788 0.3492
Payment 0.0133 *** 0.0012
Configuration 2, CC 21.1400 *** 0.3420
Configuration 3, CC 21.3841 *** 0.3562
Configuration 4, CC 21.0396 ** 0.3442
Configuration 5, CC 21.1116 *** 0.3336
Configuration 2, CMA 20.6737 ** 0.3123
Configuration 3, CMA 21.0710 *** 0.3216
Configuration 4, CMA 20.4958 * 0.3091
Configuration 5, CMA 20.8896 ** 0.3162
Conservation flag, CC 2.2508 *** 0.2935
Conservation flag, CMA 1.3770 *** 0.2625
ln(property size), CC 20.6335 *** 0.1230
ln(property size), CMA 20.4577 *** 0.1004
N (Choice sets) 710
Log L 2654.32
rho2 0.16
CC indicates conservation covenant; CMA indicates conservation management agreement. Configuration was coded as a set of dummy variables (corresponding to
alternative changes in configuration in Figure 2) with configuration 1 chosen as the status quo.
*p,0.05,
**p,0.005,
***p,0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097941.t001
Table 2. Scenarios compared using Marxan with Zones.
Scenario
Zones included (proportional
contribution of zones to
objectives in parentheses) Cost IPA Cost stewardship
Scenario 1 - Uniform costs 1 – National Park (1) Area Area
2 – IPA (1)
3 – Stewardship (1)
4 – Never Clear (0.7)a
5 – Available (0)b
Scenario 2 - Variable costs As above $2.25 per ha Estimated expected stewardship
costs per ha
Scenario 3 - Uniform costs + probability of
participation
As above Area Area
Scenario 4 - Variable costs + probability of
participation
As above $2.25 per ha Estimated expected stewardship
costs per ha
We defined scenarios in terms of zones considered, proportional contribution of zones to conservation objectives, costs of management in Indigenous Protected Areas
(IPAs), and costs of stewardship (private pastoral zone).
aAreas covered by legislation that prevents clearing, assuming that this legislation is fully effective for ensuring that the area will not be cleared but contributes less than
a protected area managed for conservation. For example these areas may be grazed or have invasive weeds or feral animals present, which may result in lower
biodiversity compared to conserved land [49].
bCurrently not managed for conservation but available for management either with IPA or stewardship.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097941.t002
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planning units. For properties under consideration for Indigenous
Protected Areas, we used an expected conservation management
cost per ha of $2.25 [25]. Because we did not distinguish between
covenants and management agreements in our optimization
problem, we calculated an expected stewardship cost per property
based on: 1. covenants receiving a premium over management
agreements (150% of total costs as compared to 100% for
management agreements); 2. the estimated probability of partic-
ipation in each mechanism; and 3. the explanatory model of
stewardship costs from Adams et al. [18] to estimate the per-ha
costs of stewardship payments. Therefore, we calculated the total
expected cost per ha of stewardship payments per property as:
E(C)~probcmaDpartccmazprobccDpartccc
where probcma is the probability of landholder i selecting a
conservation management agreement calculated with the choice
model, probcc is the probability of landholder i selecting a
conservation covenant calculated with the choice model, probcma|-
part is the probability of landholder i selecting a conservation
management agreement given the landholder has agreed to
participate in the program (equal to probcma/(1-probsell)), probcc\part is
the probability of landholder i selecting a conservation covenant
given the landholder has agreed to participate in the program
(equal to probcc/(1-probsell)), ccma is the cost of stewardship payment
to landholder i based on Adams et al [18], and ccc is 150% of ccma.
We then calculated the management cost of each planning unit
from the calculated per-ha expected cost of stewardship.
For scenarios 2 and 4 we ran Marxan with Zones to achieve
objectives within a constrained budget of $1.5 million to fund
Indigenous Protected Areas and stewardship agreements in the
catchment. This figure was based on the non-spatial financial
estimate of $1 million required for stewardship agreements across
pastoral properties in the catchment [18] and a pro-rated estimate
of $0.5 million for Indigenous Protected Areas over about 1.5
million ha of Indigenous land. To ensure that scenarios 1 and 2
were directly comparable, we selected a budget for scenario 1
equal to the average area selected in scenario 2 under the
constrained budget of $1.5 million (740,000 ha). Similarly, for
comparability of scenarios 3 and 4, we selected a budget for
scenario 3 equal to the average area selected in scenario 4 under
the constrained budget of $1.5 million (620,000 ha).
In scenarios 3 and 4 we include the estimated probability of
participation in the stewardship program in the optimization
problem to demonstrate how these data might be used in spatial
planning. We wanted to select properties with the highest
probability of participation while still meeting our objectives
within a constrained budget. To do this we included the estimated
probability of participation as a conservation feature for each
pastoral property and set a catchment-wide objective of 15% of
the total probability (which is computationally similar to the
approach used by other studies) [11]. The 15% objective was
selected to reflect the non-spatial findings of Adams et al. [18] that
a $1 million budget would be sufficient to support participation of
the most cost-efficient properties (i.e. the largest 15% of
properties). Importantly, this approach also allowed probability
of participation to be separated from stewardship costs in the
software analyses.
We ran Marxan with Zones with 100 runs for each scenario and
recorded best solutions and selection frequency for each scenario.
For the best solution in each scenario we summarized the total cost
and area as well as the cost and area for the stewardship zone (a
subset of the areas in the solution for each scenario, Table 2). For
properties selected for stewardship we also calculated the average
and median property size, percentage of properties selected for
stewardship (out of 535 properties), average probability of
participation of properties selected, and percentage of total
probability. To isolate the effects of including variable costs, we
compared scenarios 1 and 2 and scenarios 3 and 4, respectively.
To isolate the effects of including probability of participation, we
compared scenarios 2 and 4. Scenarios 1 and 3 were not directly
comparable because their area budgets were different, having been
calibrated, respectively, from scenarios 2 and 4. Lastly, we
compared scenarios 3 and 4 to examine the combined effects of
including variable costs and probability of participation.
Results
The final conditional mixed-effects logit model for the choice
experiment (Table 1) included the two significant landholder-
specific variables - ln(property size, ha) and conservation flag (p,0.001) -
in addition to the two design variables being investigated
(configuration and payment). The coefficient for property size
was negative, indicating that owners of larger properties were less
likely to participate. The coefficient for conservation flag was
positive, indicating that owners already engaged in conservation
management were more likely to participate. The coefficients for
configuration levels were negative, and increasingly so with the
extent of change in required proportion of property to be managed
for conservation. Accordingly, configuration 3, requiring land-
holders to change from no patches to one large continuous patch
set aside for conservation, had the largest negative coefficient. This
trend was similar for both covenants and management agree-
ments. However, the coefficients for covenant configurations were
more strongly negative, indicating that landholders were less likely
to select a covenant than a management agreement. The
coefficient for payment level was positive, indicating that
probability of participation increased with payment amount.
For our three payment scenarios, in which payment levels were
varied but configuration was held constant, the predicted
probabilities of participation in stewardship arrangements in-
creased from 42% to 64% as payment levels increased (Table 3).
Respondents always preferred conservation management agree-
ments to covenants. However, the payment premium for
covenants substantially increased the probability of participating
through a covenant (29% for 150% payment, 18% for 100%
payment, Table 3). The design of our choice experiment, lacking
an alternative for ‘opting-out’ of negotiations without selling,
probably produced absolute probabilities of participating that
were higher than an alternative survey design with an ‘opt-out’
choice. However, we expect that the relative probabilities between
payment levels and stewardship arrangements reliably indicate the
preferences of landholders in the Daly. In fact, the preference of
management agreements over covenants was supported by
qualitative results from in-person interviews and unsolicited
comments provided in survey responses. In addition, if the design
of the stewardship program in the Northern Territory comes to
reflect the constraints of the Queensland program, coupled with
the Delbessie Agreement, then our probabilities will be directly
applicable.
In all scenarios, there was approximately 0.5 million ha in
existing national parks and Indigenous Protected Areas and an
additional 1.5 million ha in buffer areas (the ‘never clear’ zone).
Eighty-nine of the 110 objectives were fully achieved in these
buffers and protected areas.
For the annual budget of $1.5 million to support management of
Indigenous Protected Areas and stewardship agreements, not all
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conservation objectives could be met (number of missed objectives
ranged from 8 to 11 across scenarios, Table 4). In all cases, the
100% targets for the five sites of conservation significance could
not be met. Other shortfalls were for rarer vegetation types.
Including variable costs reduced the number of properties
engaged in stewardship agreements by selecting larger properties,
a consequence of strong economies of scale for stewardship costs
(compare scenarios 1 and 2 and scenarios 3 and 4, respectively,
Table 4). Including variable costs also lowered the overall
probability of participation across selected properties because
landholders on larger properties were less likely to participate
(Table 4). The effects of considering variable costs, in terms of
number and size of properties, were more dramatic when
probability of participation was not considered (compare scenarios
1 and 2, Table 4). With probability of participation also included,
these effects of variable costs were tempered (compare scenarios 3
and 4, Table 4) by the inverse relationship between cost and
probability of participation, below.
Including variable costs and probability of participation
(scenario 4) shifted spatial selections to smaller properties with
higher probability compared to using variable costs only (scenario
2), and this increased the number of missed objectives marginally
to 11, compared to 9 in scenario 2. In relation to scenario 2, the
average probability of participation of selected properties in
scenario 4 almost doubled, the percentage of total probability in
selected properties increased five-fold, and the median property
size dropped from 3,717 ha to 579 ha (Table 4).
Compared to probability of participation with uniform costs
(scenario 3), including both probability of participation and
variable costs (scenario 4) decreased overall probability of
participation. This was because including variable costs slightly
increased the average size of properties, due to economies of scale,
but also reduced the average probability of participation, due to
the negative relationship between property size and probability of
participation (Table 1). This reflects a tension between two key
considerations in the Daly: cost-effectiveness requires that larger
properties should be targeted for stewardship, but overall
probability of participation is thereby lowered.
Discussion
Choice modelling has been applied to management of protected
areas or design of conservation incentives [22,23] but, to our
knowledge, it has not previously been combined with conservation
planning for optimal spatial design of a stewardship program. Our
choice analysis provides several insights for designing and
implementing a stewardship program in the Northern Territory.
We estimated that a large percentage of landholders – between
42% to 64%, depending on payment levels - would be willing to
participate in stewardship agreements (i.e. a covenant or a
management agreement). We found that landholders were
financially motivated in their preferences between conservation
management agreements and conservation covenants. All else
being equal, landholders preferred management agreements,
reflecting their reported concerns over the title implications of
covenants and potential negative effects on sale values. This is
consistent with previous reports of respondents’ concerns over
agreements impinging upon their rights to use and manage land
[20] and previous findings that shorter or less restrictive
management agreements are preferred [24]. However, this
preference for management agreements in the Daly can appar-
ently be weakened with a payment premium for covenants.
Covenants have benefits for the Government. The first is the
security of permanent titling [7]. Second, titling allows covenants
to be classified as IUCN-recognized protected areas (Class VI in
the case of Nature Refuges, however private protected areas may
qualify for all classes) [38] so that covenants then contribute to
national conservation goals such as the 2020 17% target under the
Convention on Biological Diversity [39].
The stewardship payment model developed by Adams et al.
[18] found strong economies of scale with the largest properties
being the most cost-efficient. However, in our choice model, the
negative coefficient associated with ln(property size, ha) indicated
that the most cost-efficient properties were also the least likely to
participate. This finding could reflect the tendency for larger
properties to be more likely associated with production land uses,
with production landholders more concerned about lost income
from stewardship agreements than non-production landholders on
smaller properties [20]. Our spatial zonings supported the findings
of Adams et al. [18] that including variable stewardship costs to
select the most cost-efficient implementation of the stewardship
program resulted in engaging with larger properties. However, our
analyses here also demonstrated that the budget level of
$1.5 million per annum was insufficient for all conservation
objectives to be met. Furthermore, if the stewardship program
were implemented as a closed-bid auction, probably even fewer
conservation objectives would be met because landholders on the
most cost-efficient properties would be less likely to submit bids.
Rather, the more willing participants would be more likely to have
smaller properties that are more costly to manage per ha, and a
larger budget would therefore be needed to meet conservation
objectives while engaging these landholders. Therefore, our
analysis indicates that, to meet the kinds of conservation objectives
used here, the design of the stewardship program would need to
encourage participation of large properties by addressing their
managers’ specific concerns about enrolling [8,20] or involve a
Table 3. Estimated probabilities of participation for three payment scenarios.
Payment scenarios
50% CC, 100% CC, 150% CC,
50% CMA 100% CMA 100% CMA
Conservation Covenant (CC) 0.13 0.18 0.29
Conservation Management Agreement (CMA) 0.29 0.40 0.35
Stewardship arrangement (CC + CMA) 0.42 0.58 0.64
Sell Property 0.58 0.42 0.36
CC indicates conservation covenant; CMA indicates conservation management agreement.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0097941.t003
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larger budget than $1.5 million to engage small properties.
Alternatively the Government might fund an outreach campaign
prior to starting the stewardship program to increase the
probability of larger properties participating.
Our choice experiment sought to mimic a key characteristic of
the Delbessie Agreement by explicitly not offering landholders a
choice to ‘opt-out’. We believe, however, that our experimental
design would not have exaggerated one of our key conclusions:
that property size was inversely related to probability of
participation, creating a tension between selecting properties that
are cost-efficient and selecting properties with landholders who are
willing to participate. Our design would have exaggerated the
negative association between property size and probability of
participating only if probability of selling and property size were
positively related, that is, if owners of larger properties were more
likely to sell than those of smaller properties. In that case, having
the option to sell rather than to engage in stewardship would be
more appealing to owners of larger properties. However, we found
that property size and number of years of ownership, admittedly
an imprecise proxy for propensity to sell, were uncorrelated. We
conclude that it is unlikely that an alternative experimental design
would have changed our observed negative association between
property size and probability of participation.
The number of studies considering variable conservation costs
has increased recently, demonstrating the benefits associated with
incorporating costs into priority setting [40]. Recent advances
have included more sophisticated dynamics such as land-market
feedbacks [41,42]. However, studies of variable costs typically
assume uniform availability of land. Specifically, they fail to
consider that some landholders will be more or less willing to
engage in conservation management, whether by selling their land
or participating in stewardship programs. Progress on incorporat-
ing costs parallels advances in integrating other social consider-
ations in systematic planning, such as measures of willingness or
social indicators of feasibility. These studies have demonstrated
ways of making plans more readily implemented [43,44].
Variation in landholders’ willingness to participate, similar to
our approach here, has been considered in two other spatial
prioritizations [11,45], but those studies included costs (unrealis-
tically) as uniform, average sales prices across properties. To our
knowledge, no previous study has included both spatially variable
costs and spatial variation in willingness to participate in spatial
optimization.
By selecting areas with spatially variable data on both costs and
willingness to participate, our study demonstrated that, with a
constrained budget, spatially variable costs can be more important
than willingness in determining conservation priorities. This is
likely to be the case more generally, where economies of scale
apply to costs such as those of acquisition and management [46–
48]. This result provides an important insight into the potential
interactions between the spatial distribution of conservation
features, costs of conservation, and willingness of landholders to
engage in conservation. These interactions will be important to
consider for future studies concerned with opportunities for and
constraints on implementation. Our analyses highlight important
design and policy issues associated with implementing a steward-
ship program in the Northern Territory and other parts of the
world. If planners understand the spatial drivers of both costs and
probability of participation, then trade-offs can be addressed pro-
actively with engagement strategies or arguments for adequate
budgets.
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